of Special Category Status for prisoners convicted of scheduled offences, a bold if controversial attempt to subject Irish republican terrorism to the constraints of normal criminal justice.
4. The purpose of the Diplock and Gardiner reports was not to conduct post-legislative scrutiny but to recommend the introduction of new procedures and law to deal with changes to the terrorist threat. In the same category falls the 1996 report of Lord Lloyd, again a serving Law Lord, who was asked to consider the future need for specific counter-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom, on the assumption that there would be a state of lasting peace in Northern Ireland. 4 Lord Lloyd's recommendations formed the basis of the Terrorism Act 2000, a permanent statute whose fortuitous timing gave it great influence over the explosion of post-9/11 legislation in other countries.
5 20 th century independent review 5. Post-legislative review of the operation of existing terrorism laws, the subject of this article, is a distinct exercise. The spur for this form of independent review was the spread of Northern Ireland-related terrorism, followed by anti-terrorism laws, into Great Britain. On 21 November 1974 the Birmingham pub bombings killed 21 people, doubling the IRA's death toll in Great Britain for the year. Eight days later, the first Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act completed its parliamentary passage. Based on older precedents, 6 that Act proscribed the IRA and made display of support for it illegal.
It enabled the making of exclusion orders restricting persons to the territory of either Great Britain or, more usually, Northern Ireland. It gave the police wide new powers of arrest and detention, and further powers -the origin of the present Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 -to conduct security checks on travellers entering and leaving Great Britain and Northern Ireland. These powers were made subject to renewal by affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament, every six months at first, and then, after March 1976, every twelve.
6. Such renewal debates never resulted in repeal, and have fallen out of fashion in recent years. 7 But back in the mid-1970s, it was the need for annual renewal that provided the spur for independent review. The Home Secretary, Merlyn Rees, spoke in the renewal debate of March 1977 about the need to "reassure those who are not supporters of the IRA but who are concerned about civil liberties", not by a "Gardiner-style report" but by the provision of "reassurance and information ... in an independent fashion." In particular, the Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939. 7 Lord Carlile in evidence to the TPIM Bill Committee described them as "a bit of a fiction, to be frank": 21 June 2011, Q70.
"Accepting the continuing need for legislation against terrorism, to assess the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1974 and 1976, with particular regard to the effectiveness of the legislation and its effect on the liberties of the subject, and to report".
Lord Shackleton described his three main tasks as discussions with the police, the consideration of procedures in the Home Office and considering the views of interested groups and individuals -a pattern that was broadly followed by subsequent reviewers. 9 In his report of August 1978, 10 Shackleton concluded that some of the powers were "clearly much more valuable than others". Some of his recommendations were accepted, including the reduction to 7 days of the maximum period for which a person could be detained under port powers (for perspective, the maximum is now nine hours and will soon be six); the improvement of safeguards after arrest; the review of exclusion orders after they had been in force for three years; and -crucially for all subsequent reviewers -the publication of quarterly statistics. 11 One major recommendation was not adopted: that the offence of withholding information about acts of terrorism should be allowed to lapse in Great Britain. He did not mention the intelligence agencies -unsurprisingly since they had no official existence at the time. For the extent to which the Shackleton Report was implemented, see the Jellicoe report of 1983 (fn13, below) at pp.10-12, paras 29-34. More specific in its scope, but also influential, was 14. Lord Carlile had an enviable grasp of policing issues, and gave the intelligence agencies due credit as they struggled in the early years of the decade to match the new and deadly threat from domestically-based al-Qaida inspired terrorism. He gave qualified support to some controversial measures, from the indefinite detention of undeportable foreign terrorism suspects -eventually declared unlawful by the House of Lords -to Tony Blair's proposal, defeated by Parliament, that the police be allowed up to 90 days to question arrested suspects. But because he was trusted, his criticisms were often heeded also. The police eventually responded to Lord Carlile's observation that they were over-using the no-suspicion arrest power under section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, though too late to save the power from defeat in Strasbourg. 30 His principled recommendation of a two-year maximum duration for control orders, which he made in full knowledge of the secret files and thus of the dangers inherent in the release of controlled persons, became the most significant of the liberalising changes that marked the replacement of control orders by TPIMs in late 2011.
15. The transition to a new Independent Reviewer in February 2011 coincided with an important policy watershed: the publication of the Coalition Government's CounterTerrorism Review. 31 Billed as "a correction in favour of liberty", this document announced a loosening of the legislative ratchet to a degree which is seldom fully appreciated. The first three years of the current Parliament saw the raising of the threshold for freezing terrorist assets, a reduction in the maximum pre-charge detention period from 28 to 14 days, the replacement of control orders by the less onerous TPIMs, the repeal of the section 44 stop and search power and the introduction of enhanced safeguards for the retention of biometric data. Contingency plans were made in case the reduced powers proved insufficient. 32 However none of those contingencies have so far been activated, even under the global pressure that attended preparations for that major potential target, the London Olympics. Bills were drafted, and subjected to pre-legislative scrutiny, that could enable the speedy reintroduction both of 28-day detention before charge and of "enhanced TPIMs", with many of the characteristics of control orders. Section 47A of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows limited no-suspicion stop and search powers to be authorised, but only when a senior officer reasonably suspects that an act of terrorism will take place. See 18. How the current Independent Reviewer has performed during this unusual period of liberalisation is for others to judge. The nine reports produced in my first three years, comprising more than 700 pages of text and 63 recommendations, are all available on my website, 38 together with evidence given to parliamentary committees and other materials. Anyone who assumes that the Reviewer's function is to torment the Government, or conversely to defend it, will be disappointed. I have sought, like my predecessors, only to give an informed, considered and independent view. their identities and conveyed the wish of the Home Secretary -to whom I had no connection or political affiliation -that I should accept the job. They knew, but did not seem to mind, that I was acting at the time for an alleged former associate of Osama bin Laden, whose assets had been frozen on the insistence of the British Government. candidates by an open, fair and merit-based process, from which Ministers will choose. Whether to re-appoint an Independent Reviewer at the end of their term of office will remain a decision for Government alone, subject to a 10-year limit on tenure.
THE WORK OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEWER
24. My initial term of office was fixed at three years and expired in February 2014. 29. I give occasional interviews to radio and TV channels in the UK, both mainstream and those with a specific ethnic or religious focus. This brings more benefits than I expected. It keeps the Government on its toes: attention is never more prompt than when it is known that I will be discussing sensitive issues in a public forum. It ensures attention from politicians, for whom media exposure is a highly-valued currency. Last but not least, live interviews allow the Reviewer to dispense information, reassurance or concern to an audience that pays for his work through its taxes but lacks time or inclination to look up his reports.
Working methods

25
Australian comparisons
30. Statutory references to the Independent Reviewer are scattered and uninformative. A more modern approach is taken in Australia, where the functions, powers, duties and immunities of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), the Independent Reviewer's closest international equivalent, are meticulously set out in a 34-section statute. 54 The INSLM has extensive powers to gather information: failure to attend a hearing when summoned, or to produce a document requested, is punishable by up to six months' imprisonment. 55 The authority of the Independent Reviewer, by contrast, is anchored largely in trust and convention. In defence of the UK system, successive reviewers have in practice been given what they need; and as both sides are aware, the withholding of relevant information could in extremis be brought to the attention of Parliament or interested media. Full statutory underpinning, though logical, is therefore perhaps not pressing.
31. Sensitive issues in both countries are publication dates and Government responses. My reports have invariably been published within three weeks of receipt, the intervening time being occupied by security checking, briefing of Ministers and preparation of the printed version. It was however necessary on one occasion to remind the Government (or its special advisers) of an undertaking given to Parliament to act with promptness.
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The Government responds to each report, though not always in a timely fashion and in terms that have been criticised as insufficiently thorough. expectation of rejection. 62 It may also be difficult to tell, from a blandly-phrased response, to what extent a recommendation has been accepted: this is not an entirely negative comment, since more is sometimes done behind the scenes than is admitted to on the record.
Direct influence on Government
33. There are areas, often technical and out of the public eye, in which a Reviewer can speak directly to Government and Government will simply do as it is advised. In that category belong the 12 recommendations that I made during my first term of office in relation to the procedures for operating the Terrorist Asset-Freezing &c. Act 2010, each of which has been promptly accepted and implemented by the Treasury.
34. Direct influence may also be exerted privately and so undisclosably, for example through comments on a draft Code of Practice, discussions with intelligence chiefs or conversations with a Minister about the likely practical consequences of a clause being contemplated for inclusion in a Government Bill. Nor is such influence confined to Government; opposition spokespersons for example may quiz the Independent Reviewer in order to help inform their own policy positions, particularly on legal or operational issues with which they have little familiarity.
35. Closer to the coalface, it is a routine experience to see copies of the Reviewer's reports, sometimes freshly-printed but often well-thumbed, on desks in Whitehall and in police headquarters. The executive branch is no monolith, and the capacity for independent thought is not surrendered on entry to the public service. My base in the Home Office gives me valuable opportunities for informal discussions with civil servants; ideas that commend themselves to policy advisers within Government can achieve wider currency by that route.
Influence in conjunction with others
36. Less direct but just as significant are the other, multiple channels through which influence can percolate. Anti-terrorism law is the crucible for some of society's most heated debates about the function of the state. The subject-matter can be emotive, and the stakes for liberty, security and community cohesion are high. On the central legal and policy issues, many people have a view; and the views of reasonable people can differ. The Independent Reviewer may legitimately hope that his own conclusions will be considered with particular care by Government: for his assessments are informed by full knowledge both of the threat and of the capacity available to counter it. But it cannot be presumed that his recommendations will simply be adopted by a Government which has the same knowledge and which is additionally subject to constraints of a financial and political nature. b. The Independent Reviewer's ability to look at the operation of anti-terrorism laws in a non-contentious atmosphere, and without restricting himself to such cases as may happen to be brought and such facts as the parties to those cases may have chosen to place in evidence, can similarly be of assistance to the courts in forming or confirming their own conclusions.
The capacity to add value by either of these routes is naturally dependent on the Independent Reviewer being perceived to be thorough, trustworthy and sensible. that led to the Justice and Security Act 2013. 73 Among other things, that Act made available to the High Court a "closed material procedure" or CMP, for use both in deportation/exclusion judicial reviews and in damages claims against the organs of the State. In a CMP, evidence relating to national security can be adduced and taken into account by the judge despite it having been shown not to the affected individual or her lawyers but only to a security-cleared special advocate, instructed on the individual's behalf but unable to take instructions once proceedings have entered their "closed" phase.
43. Progress towards the Act began with a Green Paper of October 2011. The subjectmatter fell outside my statutory responsibilities but was tangentially relevant to them, in that similar closed material procedures already operated for legal challenges to control orders, asset freezes and proscription orders. Perhaps for that reason, the JCHR invited me to give evidence on the proposals in January 2012. Two issues arose which were dependent on access to secret information not available to members of the JCHR. The first was whether, as the Government asserted, there were civil cases for whose fair resolution a CMP was necessary. The second was whether the intelligence relationship with the USA was affected, as the Government again asserted, by UK courts having assumed the power to disclose into open proceedings US intelligence material to which the "control principle" applied and to whose disclosure the US objected. 74 44. On the first issue, the briefings that I initially requested could not answer all my questions and were insufficiently full for me to express a definite view. As I told the JCHR, I was unsure whether this simply indicated excessive caution on the part of the security establishment, or whether, more concerningly, the Government lacked the evidence to support its case. 75 These public comments appear to have galvanised the Government. I was given unfettered access to seven cases, reading all the secret material and discussing the issues both with Government departments and agencies and with the independent barristers representing them. I concluded, cautiously, that there was a small but indeterminate category of national security-related claims in respect of which it was preferable that the option of a CMP -for all its inadequacies -should exist. 76 That conclusion, though not uncritically accepted by the JCHR, 77 48. This episode shows both how parliamentary committees can provide a platform for the Independent Reviewer, and how in return their own deliberations can be assisted by the close questioning of a Reviewer who has access to material that they do not. 86 The quality of scrutiny may thus be improved by a degree of co-ordination between the Independent Reviewer and select committees. With this in mind, it may occasionally be useful for the Independent Reviewer to speak to parliamentary committees about how their terrorism-related reviews might be focussed, and how he might best assist.
Case study 2: port powers 49. Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 empowers the police to detain travellers through a port for up to nine hours, for the purpose of determining whether they are terrorists. No suspicion has hitherto been required at any stage. Failure to answer questions is a criminal offence, and PACE-style safeguards are largely absent. Prized by the authorities, not least as an intelligence-gathering tool, Schedule 7 did not feature in the Coalition Government's 2011 announcement of reforms. Legal challenges to the exercise of the power were few, and generally unsuccessful: in one 2011 case, permission to apply for judicial review was refused on the basis that:
"The legislation or its predecessor has been in existence since 1974. Its effectiveness and the need for its existence has been confirmed by the annual reports of Lord Carlile. I do not doubt that the claimant feels he has been wrongly and unfairly treated ...But the power is necessary in a democratic society and .. the contrary is not arguable."
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Though since overtaken by events, the court's words are a reminder that the Independent Reviewer -like other forms of review -can be as useful in justifying the status quo as in making the case for change. Review can shine a searchlight but can also operate as a veil, shielding anti-terrorism powers from other forms of scrutiny.
50. Struck by the breadth of the power and the ill-feeling that it can engender, I recommended in my Terrorism Act reports of 2011 and 2012 that there should be a full public consultation and review of Schedule 7. At that stage the main pressure for reform came from Muslim groups such as the Federation of Student Islamic Societies, which made some successful freedom of information requests, and from Liberty which backed a challenge in Strasbourg. Eventually the Home Secretary agreed to the public consultation and review that I had twice recommended. That process was however tightly focussed on six proposed changes, for which parliamentary time was found in an omnibus Bill. 88 Though sensible, these changes did not touch on the major issues: the no-suspicion threshold, the compulsion to answer questions, the practice of proceeding with interviews without waiting for solicitors and the claimed power -first publicised in my reports, then taken up by the press -to download and retain the contents of travellers' mobile phones without the need for suspicion or warrant. I flagged my principal concerns to the JCHR in 2012. 89 The The JCHR explained its differences with my approach to the suspicion threshold in a further report of 6 January 2014. were relied upon by all parties to each of the cases just mentioned, and feature also in each of the judgments. Mr Miranda's own claim for judicial review was determined in February 2014, in a judgment which amply demonstrates the breadth of the current statutory definition of terrorism. 54. These case studies show that streams of influence run through a variety of channels, intersecting and reinforcing one another. Whilst the Independent Reviewer is only one channel among many, the Reviewer's ability to influence Government directly can be supplemented by parliamentary and judicial processes in which his observations and recommendations may be found helpful.
CONCLUSION
55. The subject of post-legislative scrutiny has seen much debate in recent years, 100 but consistency of practice remains elusive. It is for consideration whether other areas of UK law, or indeed the anti-terrorism laws of other countries, might benefit from a similar type of scrutiny, whether on the UK model or as more clearly defined in Australia.
56. There have been various suggestions for reform, though never so far as I am aware for abolition. The appointment of a review panel, first floated in 1984 (when it was rejected for security rather than economic reasons) 101 and revived by Professor Walker, 102 could bring greater diversity of approach and perhaps greater authority. 103 However the division and delegation of work could lead to a diminution in the range and focus displayed by previous Reviewers; the strong personal relationships on which successful tenure of the post depends would be difficult for a panel to maintain; strong candidates for the current role might be less attracted by the idea of sitting on a committee; and in the worst case, reports might become the bland products of compromise. These factors speak in favour of a panel approach to future root-and-branch reviews of anti-terrorism law (though the authority of Lord Lloyd, who conducted the last such review, was certainly not diminished by the fact that the resulting report bore his name alone). 57 . Nor in my opinion should the post be made full-time: it is the ability to continue practising in an independent profession that has enticed strong candidates to accept the post in the past, and that provides the surest protection against the strong pressures encountered in it, sometimes from unexpected directions. But should the workload continue to increase, the assistance of a part-time junior will have to be considered, security cleared as appropriate.
58. The office of Independent Reviewer has been an unusual but durable source of scrutiny. It is peculiarly appropriate for an area in which potential conflicts between state power and civil liberties are acute, but information is tightly rationed. Successive Independent Reviewers have used their unique access to reassure the public, to inform the antiterrorism debate and where appropriate to raise the alarm. It is to be hoped that they will continue to do so.
